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Abstract 
Introducing effective marine reserves is a critical issue in fisheries management and 
marine ecosystem conservation. In recent years, a number of marine reserves or no-take 
marine protected areas (MPAs) have been implemented worldwide, and some MPAs 
have shown ecological and economic benefits. However, consideration for coordinated 
competition between institutions, a central for successful resource management, is often 
omitted in research on effective MPA management. Given increasing discussions on 
implementing MPAs in the high seas, where international fisheries often exemplify the 
tragedy of the commons, understanding potential competition between institutions can 
affect MPA management. With this in mind, we aimed to gain generic insight into 
non-cooperative fisheries management with MPAs. Specifically, we explored the effect 
of MPA establishment on (1) competition strength between fishery institutions, (2) fish 
population abundance resulting from the competition, and (3) distribution of the gross 
fishery profit between institutions. To approach these questions, we developed a 
minimal model that accounts a non-cooperative behavior of fishery institutions and 
population dynamics under the MPAs management. We demonstrate that, given a small 
price-to-cost ratio, a prominent increase in fishery competition could occur as a result of 
introducing an MPA, leading to reductions in fisheries profits and fish population 
abundance, and greater unevenness in distribution of the gross fishery profit. Intensified 
fishery competition was typically observed in the case where the rate of population 
exchange between the fishing grounds and the MPA is not large, and the fraction of the 
MPA is intermediate, suggesting that regulation agreements will be required to 
coordinate the competitive harvesting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The introduction of effective marine reserves has been a critical consideration in 
fisheries management and marine ecosystem conservation (Pikitch et al. 2004). Marine 
reserves or no-take marine protected areas (MPAs) are increasingly being used globally, 
both within national jurisdictions and in the high seas, and the pace of its new 
enforcement has been accelerated (Leenhardt et al. 2013; Edgar et al. 2014; Lubchenco 
and Grorud-Colvert 2015; Gill et al. 2017). This global trend has evoked a number of 
researches exploring the potential impact of MPAs establishment on marine ecosystems 
and a way to make MPAs management beneficial socially, economically, and 
ecologically (Baskett and Barnett 2015; Fulton et al. 2015, Gill et al. 2017). 
 Coordinating competition between institutions or fishers is of central importance 
for successful fishery management (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990; Pomeroy and Berkes 
1997). Typically, fisheries that exploit highly migratory species that traverse multiple 
exclusive economic zones, and the high seas (~58% of the ocean) are more likely to 
overfish or deplete than those exploit exclusively (McWhinnie 2009) and these fisheries 
often exemplify the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (White and Costello 2014), a typical 
example of undesirable outcome of non-cooperative resource management. Also, illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has pervasively escalated in the past 20 years 
both within EEZ, and the high seas, and these lead to race to fish, overexploitations, and 
significant collateral damage to ecosystems (High Seas Task Force 2006; Ostrom 2008; 
Agnew et al. 2009). Given increased discussions concerning the high seas closure 
(Sumaila et al. 2007; Leenhardt et al. 2013; Lubchenco and Grorud-Colvert 2015), 
further insight into the potential impacts of MPA establishment on non-cooperative 
management, which is likely to occur in the high seas, or fisheries targeting a species 
that traverses multiple EEZs, would be of critically importance to predict management 
outcomes and give management implications to reduce the risk of producing a ‘tragedy 
of the commons’. Although with prevalence of the tragedy of commons in fisheries 
management, previous researches of MPA management typically focus on the case of 
sole-owner management, where competition does not occur (e.g., Neubert 2003; 
Takashina et al. 2012; Kar and Ghosh 2013; Takashina and Mougi 2014; Ghosh et al. 
2017). Limited research has been conducted on the strategic decision-making of fishers 
in the context of MPA management (Punt et al. 2010). Ruijs and Janmaat (2007) 
explored strategic MPA placement within a national boundary wherein two nations 
share the fishing resource through species migration. They found that ‘the prisoner’s 
dilemma’ occurs in the absence of cooperation between countries. Sumaila (2002) 
simulated the economic rent over a 28-year-period of two non-cooperative management 
groups, using the specific example of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery equipped with 
an age-structured two-patch model. With an assumption of one-directional fish 
migration from the MPA to the fishing grounds, the study concluded that economic rent 
is maximized when the size of the MPA is 50%–70% of the concerned region, and the 
standing biomass peaks around this point. Kellner et al. (2007) showed MPA 
establishment causes high fishing pressure along its boundary, resulting in fishers’ 
competitive behavior to maximize catch per unit effort, and it equalizes the population 
abundance across the area outside the MPA. 
 Given deficiencies in previous studies, we aimed to gain generic insight into 
non-cooperative management with MPAs, and particularly (1) the effect of MPA 
establishment on strength of the competition behavior, (2) changes in population 
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abundance as a result of the competition, and (3) distribution of the gross fishery profit 
between the fishery institutions. To address these issues, we developed a simple 
spatially-explicit model to account for non-cooperative behavior of fishery institutions 
and the population dynamics under the MPA management, and compare the 
management outcome with its sole-owner counterparts; the most common assumption 
of optimal fishing without competition. The model is a two-patch extension of the 
Schaefer model (Schaefer 1954): one patch represents the fishing grounds, wherein 
non-cooperative management takes place, and the other patch is an MPA, wherein no 
fishing activity occurs. We demonstrate that given a small price-to-cost ratio, a 
prominent increase in competition between institutions will occur owing to 
implementing the MPA, likely leading to well below fishery profit and population 
abundance than the sole-owner management, and greater unevenness in distribution of 
the gross fishery profit. Intensive competition would typically be observed when the 
population exchange rate between the fishing ground and the MPA is not large, and 
intermediate fractions of the MPA exist, suggesting that regulations will be required to 
coordinate competitive harvesting. Notably, it has repeatedly reported that, with these 
conditions, implementing MPAs can improve fishery profits as well as population 
abundance and reproductive capacity. However, our findings suggest that a careful 
implementation is needed under these conditions, since our results shows intensive 
competitions would occur in non-cooperative management, leading to well below 
benefit of MPAs management and population size compared to sole-owner 
management. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Non-spatial model for non-cooperative fisheries management 
 
Here, we describe a model of non-cooperative fisheries management (hereafter, 
non-cooperative management) that accounts for the population dynamics of a target 
species and the spatial structure of the region concerned. We extend the Schaefer model 
(Schaefer 1954), which has been widely used in investigations of game-theoretic 
approaches to fisheries management (e.g., Mesterton-Gibbons 1993; Kaitala and 
Lindroos 2007), to a two-patch model so as to quantify the spatial effect on 
non-cooperative management (Fig. 1). The similar, spatially generalized Schaefer 
model was investigated in Takashina and Mougi (2015). Given a species’ maximum 
growth rate per unit time r, carrying capacity K, catchability !", and the fishing effort of 
institution i per unit time #", the dynamics of population abundance x in the Schaefer 
model with n-institution fisheries is described as follows: 
    $%$& = () 	1 − %- − !"#")./"     (1) 
Following Clark (1990), given the price per unit of abundance harvested 0" and the 
cost per unit fishing effort of institution i, 1" , the equilibrium fisheries profit of 
institution i is 
    2" = 0"!")∗ − 1" #",      (2) 
where, )∗  is the equilibrium population abundance. To quantify the efficiency of 
fishery institution i, Mesterton-Gibbons (1993) defined the efficiency parameter as 4" ≔ 1"/(80"!"). By setting the value of the efficiency parameter properly, we can 
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discuss, for example, the effect of improving fishing technology, which may lower the 
cost per unit fishing effort. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic description of non-cooperative fisheries management with MPA 
establishment. Each symbol in the fishing grounds represents a different institution, 
whereby each institution makes a rational decision in terms of maximizing its own 
fisheries profit; 1 − : and :, respectively, are the fractions of the fishing grounds and 
the MPA.  
 
2.2 Model with two-patch extension for non-cooperative management 
 
A spatially explicit model of non-cooperative management is highly complex, and 
hence is not feasible for deriving analytical results except in certain extreme situations, 
such as where a species has an extremely high migration rate m. To make the discussion 
clearer here, we restricted ourselves to the simplest possible situation. Namely, we 
considered a two-institution two-patch extension of the Schaefer model, where one 
patch represents open fishing grounds and the other patch represents an MPA (Fig. 1), 
and the two patches are connected by a simple manner of fish movement or migration. 
However, to check the sensitivity of our minimal assumptions, more complex situations, 
such as n-institution management under some extreme conditions or different migration 
schemes of the species, are considered in Appendix A and B.  
As mentioned, in the model, migration of a target species connects the two 
patches. By adding an exchange term to Eq. (1), a two-patch extension of the Schaefer 
model may be described as 
    $%;$& = ()< 	1 − %;-; − !"#")< + > )<, )@@" ,    (3a) 
    $%A$& = ()@ 	1 − %A-A − > )<, )@ ,    (3b) 
where, )B is population abundance in patch j, and where j = 1 and 2 are the fishing 
grounds and the MPA, respectively. 8< = (1 − :)8 and 8@ = :8 are the carrying 
capacity of patch 1 and 2, and 1 − : and : are the areal fractions of the fishing 
grounds and the MPA, respectively. Finally, >()<, )@) is the population-exchange 
function between the two patches. One of the simplest forms of the migration term may 
be > )<, )@ = C(D@<)@ − D<@)<), where m is the population exchange rate between 
patches, with the patch-specific weighting term DBBE denoting migration from patch F 
to F′. Letting DBBE be proportional to the areal fraction of the destination patch, we 
obtain a random migration form (Takashina and Mougi 2015): 
    > )<, )@ = C{(1 − :))@ − :)<},     (4) 
where, the population exchange rate C now has the dimensions of time and area. 
Because only the population in the fishing grounds contributes to the fisheries profits, 
Fishing ground
MPA!
1 − !
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then )∗ in Eq. (2) is replaced with )<∗ for the fishery profit of institution i in the 
spatially explicit harvest model. 
Under non-cooperative management, each institution makes a rational decision, 
under which no change in their allowable choices increases their profits. This solution is 
the so-called Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951). The objective function of non-cooperative 
management is shown as: 
 2"JKLMA = maxQR 0"!")<JKLMA − 1" #",   (i =1, 2)  (5) 
where, the superscript Nash@  indicates the Nash equilibrium under a situation of 
two-institution management. To investigate the spatial effect of non-cooperative 
management, we also calculated the optimal profit under sole-owner management. 
Specifically, if management is conducted by a sole owner, we write Eq. (5) as 2VWXY =maxQZ 0[![)<VWXY − 1[ #[where the subscript s indicates the sole-owner management 
counterparts of the parameters defined above. In addition, we assume that the sole 
owner can chose one of the better management options: 4[ = min(4<, 4@) ; because 2VWXY is clearly the Pareto-optimal, then 2"JKLMA ≤ 2VWXY@"  is always satisfied.  
 
2.3 Measures to quantify the spatial effect on non-cooperative management 
 
Next, we introduced measures to quantify the spatial effect of non-cooperative 
management in relation to the result in the case of sole-owner management. For 
convenience, we use the letter ` for all the measures defined below. 
Changes in intensity of competition between the institutions may be measured 
through the fractional decline in gross fishery profit over the two institutions from the 
Pareto-optimal profit: 
    `abA = 		c;defghcAdefgcijkl ,   (6) 
where, the subscript 2 represents the number of actual institutions, and the same 
notation is used for the other measures. As 2VWXY is the Pareto-optimal, 0 ≤ `abA ≤ 1 
is satisfied, and a smaller value indicates more intense competition; but if `abA = 1, 
then no competition occurs. Specifically, we define `abA = (0 + 0)/0 = 0, and this 
may occur when the fraction of the MPA is sufficiently large and then fishery is not 
anymore profitable. 
For determining evenness of the distribution of the gross fishery profit between 
the two institutions, we define 
    `YoA = 		c;defg	c;defghcAdefg,   (7) 
where, `YoA also satisfies the inequality 0 ≤ `YoA 	≤ 1. Hence, `YoA = 0, 1/2 or 1, 
respectively, are achieved when institution 1 does not make any profit (2<JKLM = 0), the 
gross profit obtained by the two institutions is equally distributed (2<JKLM = 	2@JKLM), or 
institution 1 takes the entire profit (2@JKLM = 0). An equal distribution of the fisheries 
profits arises if the two institutions have identical values in the efficiency parameter, 
that is 4< = 4@. 
Besides measures related to economic factors, we also defined an ecological 
measure quantifying the impact of harvesting competition on population abundance. 
Given that the total population abundance (p = )< + )@) resulted in a non-cooperative 
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strategy as did sole-owner management, represented as pJKLMA and pVWXY, respectively, 
we define 
     `bKA = 		qdefgAqijkl .   (8) 
Intensive competition by way of intensive fishing effort may reduce this value. 
 
2.4. Numerical simulation 
 
In numerical study, without loss of generality, we set ! = !" = 1 (i =1, 2) and 
assumed that any changes in the efficiency parameter of institution i, 4", would be 
reflected in change in the cost of fishing effort 1". Hence, we set 0 = 0" = 1, and thus 0! = 0"!" = 1 (i =1, 2). We examined three orders of magnitude difference in the 
value of the cost of fishing effort 1": one order of magnitude smaller, one order of 
magnitude larger, and the same magnitude in comparison with the value for price per 
unit of harvest 0. Specifically, we examined the three orders of magnitude difference in 
values for the price-to-cost ratio 0/1". 
 
3. Results 
 
Simulations under the situation where two institutions have a comparable efficiency 
parameter (4[ = 4< = 4@ ) showed that the introduction of an MPA increases the 
intensity of competition between the institutions, resulting in smaller values of `abA 
(Fig. 2, top). This effect is prominent when the cost of fishing effort 1" is small, and it 
is suppressed as the cost of fishing effort increases. Not surprisingly, if the cost of 
fishing effort is sufficiently high (1" 	= 10 in this example) and the fraction of the MPA : becomes large, the fishery does not make a profit (Fig. 2, top right). More intense 
competition (i.e., when the value of `abA is small) is typically observed when the 
fraction of the MPA is an intermediate value and the value of the exchange rate m is less 
than 10. As expected, the proportion of total population abundance `bKA tends to be 
smaller when the intensity of competition is higher (Fig. 2, bottom), suggesting that 
introduction of an MPA can result in reduced population abundance as compared with a 
situation of sole-owner management. However, if the rate of population exchange 
between the patches is small (i.e., m is near 0.1), this effect is suppressed. 
Next, we considered the situation where one institution has a smaller value for the 
efficiency parameter than does the other institution (4[ = 4< < 4@). Specifically, we set 4[ = 4< = 0.84@, and, by the assumption above, this is reflected in the cost of fishing 
effort, 1[ = 1< = 0.81@. Despite different values for the efficiency parameter, we still 
obtained qualitatively similar results for the fractional decline of the gross fishery profit 
(`abA) and the proportion of total population abundance (`bKA) (see Fig. 3, top and 
middle). However, the distribution of the gross fishery profit between the two 
institutions became uneven, and was biased toward the institution with a lower value for 
the efficiency parameter (i.e., institution 1 tended to get a larger share of the profits in 
the parameter space investigated: `YoA ≥ 1/2). Notably, this bias was prominent when 
the intensity of competition was high (i.e., when the value of `abA is small; Fig. 3, 
bottom). In this example, institution 1 had 20% smaller values for the efficiency 
parameter, yet qualitatively similar results were obtained when institution 1 was 
assigned 40% smaller values for the efficiency parameter, 1[ = 1< = 0.61@ (Appendix 
C, Fig. C3). 
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Along with the simulation results described above, we also examined the effect of 
n-player harvesting, different forms of population exchange between the patches, a 
density-dependent exchange rate (Appendix B, Figs. B1 and B2), and parameter 
sensitivity (Appendix C, Figs. C1–C3). Overall, we found that in several cases, 
harvesting competition became intense as a result of introducing an MPA, and this was 
typically observed in a parameter space where the population exchange rate is not high 
and the fraction of the MPA is intermediate (corresponding to the results presented in 
Figs. 2 and 3, top). In addition, such a case was likely to occur when the cost of the 
fishery effort is small, or the maximum growth rate/carrying capacity of the target 
species is large. In addition, we also gave an analytical form to the three measures of 
harvesting competition of two or n-player harvesting (Eqs. 6–8) wherein the population 
exchange rate had an extreme value (C = 0 or C ≫ 1). In such situations, the degree 
of harvesting competition increased as the number of institutions increased, 
corresponding to results obtained in a non-spatially explicit harvest model by 
Mesterton-Gibbons (1993). 
 
 
Figure 2: Non-cooperative fisheries management with MPA establishment. The x axis 
is the MPA fraction (i.e., the right-side patch shown in Fig. 1; 0 ≤ : ≤ 0.95), and the y 
axis is the population exchange rate between the patches, m. Each column shows 
different costs of fishing effort (c = 0.1, 1, 10). The first row of figures shows the 
fractional decline in gross fishery profit `abA  relative to a scenario of sole-owner 
management (see Eq. 6). The second row of figures shows that the proportion of total 
population abundance, pJKLMA/pVWXY  (see Eq. 8), where the numerator and 
denominator are resulted in non-cooperative management and sole-owner management 
scenario, respectively. Other parameter values are r = 1, K = 100. Note that when the 
fraction of the MPA : is 0, it corresponds to the (non-spatially explicit) Schaefer 
model. 
 
 8 
 
Figure 3: Non-cooperative fisheries management with MPA establishment but with 
different efficiency parameters (4[ = 4< = 0.84@, equivalently 1[ = 1< = 0.81@). The x 
axis is the fraction of the MPA (i.e., the right-side patch shown in Fig. 1; 0 ≤ : ≤0.95), and the y axis is the population exchange rate between the patches m. Each 
column shows different costs of fishing effort (1@ = 0.1, 1, 10; the notations of the 
first and second rows of figures are the same as for Figure 2). The third row of figures 
represents evenness in distribution of the gross fishery profit between the two 
institutions (see Eq. 7). 
 
Discussion 
 
By developing a simple spatially-explicit model of non-cooperative fisheries 
management in the context of MPA establishment, we investigated how introducing an 
MPA might change the degree of harvesting competition, the population abundance as a 
result of the competition, and the distribution of gross fishery profit between two 
institutions. With a small price-to-cost ratio we found that a prominent increase in 
harvesting competition could occur owing to introducing an MPA, leading to a largely 
lower fishery profit as well as reduced population abundance as compared with a 
scenario of sole-owner management. In addition, when the efficiency parameter values 
differed between the institutions, unevenness in distribution of the gross fishery profit 
increased as harvesting competition intensified. The simulations showed that intense 
competition is typically observed in a parameter space where the population exchange 
rate between the fishing grounds and the MPA is not large, and the fractions of the MPA 
is intermediate. Notably, in the context of sole-owner management within such a set of 
parameter values, it is well known that implementing MPAs can improve fisheries 
profits as well as population abundance and reproductive capacity (Gerber et al. 2003; 
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Moffitt et al. 2009; Williams et al. 2009; Goñi et al. 2010; Gruss et al. 2011). 
Importantly, the present findings suggest that consideration for the outcomes of 
non-cooperative management and ways to regulate especially intensive harvesting 
competition is crucial for implementing effective MPAs. 
 The inefficiency of fisheries management with MPA establishment by way of 
increased levels of harvesting competition is mainly caused by the generally 
open-access regime, exacerbating a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ through the high capability of 
the fishing effort. Indeed, an increase in fishing effort is suppressed when the cost of the 
fishing effort is large enough, thereby suppressing the prisoner’s dilemma through the 
small capability of the fishing effort (Figs. 2 and 3, top right). Fisheries regulations that 
directly increase the cost of fishing effort may be possible. Rearranging a given amount 
of subsidies would provide a basis for potential regulation, since government subsidies 
enable fishers to exert a larger fishing effort (Munro and Sumaila 2002; Pauly et al. 
2002). For example, a reduction in fuel subsidies may reduce the capability of fishing 
efforts (Sumaila et al. 2008) and this may in turn increase the value of the cost of 
fishing effort and suppress harvesting competition between institutions; as in the effect 
in Figs. 2 and 3, top right. 
Instead of direct regulation of fishing capability, limited access or clarification of 
resource-use rights are alternative ways to achieve successful resource management 
(Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1992). Limited access adjusts harvesting by the 
stakeholders, motivating them to develop and implement harvesting rules. Fisheries 
co-management, which is widely applied in situations of small-scale or coastal 
management (Hilborn et al. 2005; Makino and Matsuda 2005; Matsuda et al. 2010), is 
one such example—demonstrated to improve participation in decision-making 
processes of multi-level governance and mitigate conflicts between institutions by 
developing management rules (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Jentoft et al. 1998; Hilborn 
et al. 2005). For many pelagic fishes instead, such as bluefin tuna, is managed under 
regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) comprising multi-member states 
(Boustany 2011). Members of RFMOs develop and agree upon the conservation 
framework and management measures for the target species, as well as on 
implementation at the country level (Boustany 2011). 
As mentioned above, limited access and inclusive decision-making bodies are 
essential treatments to mitigate the so-called prisoner’s dilemma. However, the 
available literature shows that the prisoner’s dilemma could still easily occur when 
mutual trust between institutional members and/or harsh punishments for rule-breakers 
are lacking (Yamagishi 1986; Boyd and Richerson 1992; Fehr and Gächter 2000). 
Developing surveillance, monitoring network, and traceability of catch have been 
proposed to prevent illegal fishing (High Seas Task Force 2006; Agnew et al. 2009; 
Flothmann et al. 2010; Borit and Olsen 2012; Österblom 2014). Territorial-use rights in 
fisheries (TURFs) introduced to co-management situations is one way to facilitate 
fisheries surveillance (Hilborn et al. 2005). For instance, TURF systems are applied to 
nearshore coastal fisheries in Japan and Chile (Matsuda et al. 2010; Cancino et al. 2007), 
to assure that the different fishers have a degree of ownership of the resource in an 
allotted area. 
Lack of fairness or satisfaction among all stakeholders for the established 
management policies may also lead to poor management outcomes. For example, 
suppose the efficiency parameter values are highly heterogeneous among institutions 
(e.g., different costs of fishing effort), yet the same harvesting quota is assigned to each 
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institution regardless of their efficiency. With the homogeneous harvesting quota, an 
institution with sufficiently high efficiency may be tempted to break rule to seek even 
more profit by increasing the fishing effort. (McFadden 1976; McKelvey and Palfrey 
1995). In such a situation, discussions aimed at balancing economic efficiency and 
fairness among the various institutions are fundamental for arriving at effective 
management rules. There are a body of researches motivated to understand the 
mechanism to overcome unintended outcomes of resource management through fields 
researches, laboratory experiments, and game theoretic studies (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et 
al. 1994; Ostrom 2009; Tavoni et al. 2012; Iwasa and Lee 2013; Lee et al. 2015) 
Incorporating these approaches into our spatially-explicit management model may 
further develop our insight into MPAs management with non-cooperative situations. 
In addition, ecological aspects are also important considerations to guarantee that 
developed management regimes work properly: animal migration may cause incomplete 
coordination of the property rights, also leading to the prisoner’s dilemma. For example, 
in TURFs management, the size of each TURF should be carefully chosen based on 
ecological knowledge of a target species, particularly since TURFs encompassing 
smaller areas may cause incomplete property rights because of adult spillover and larval 
export, ultimately intensifying competition between the harvesters of each TURF 
(White and Costello 2011).  
 Along with management schemes, the movement and manner of species migration 
between patches are also known to affect the performance of an implemented MPA by 
changing the degree of adult spillover (Gruss et al. 2011; Takashina et al. 2012; 
Takashina and Mougi 2014). Although we examined the effect of density dependence in 
the population exchange scheme (Appendix C, Figs. C1 and C2) as part of an 
ecologically plausible manner of relocation, it is not an easy task to judge whether the 
density-dependent effect occurs, and there may be a time-lag for before the effect takes 
place if the stock size decreases before implementing an MPA (Gruss et al. 2011). 
Nevertheless, assessing the population exchange rate between adjacent patches plays a 
central role in effective implementation of MPAs. 
 Here, we showed that consideration for institutions’ non-cooperative behavior in 
relation to MPA establishment is of critical importance when assessing the effectiveness 
of an MPA. Our results suggest that the implementation of an MPA must be 
accompanied by regulations to ease competition between institutions harvesting in the 
adjacent areas. To acquire basic insight into the non-cooperative behavior in relation to 
MPA management, we necessarily omitted some otherwise important ecological and 
economic aspects, such as age/size-structure in the population dynamics of the targeted 
species, multiple-species consideration, and non-infinitely elastic demand for the fish 
resource. Although consideration of these aspects in this study would have increased the 
difficulty of extracting general insight, they will unavoidably need to be applied to 
specific management situations. 
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Appendix A Analytical results at m≫ 1 and m = 0
Although even our simplest possible model for non-cooperative fisheries management with MPAs
is not amenable a mathematical analysis, we can get some analytical results at some extreme
conditions such as when the exchange rate has extreme values m ≫ 1 and m = 0. Here, we
describe some results under such extreme conditions. Note unlike the analysis in the main text,
we do not restrict ourselves to the assumption of two-player management as well as an identical
eﬃciency parameters.
Appendix A.1 Aggregated form of Eq. (1) with the suﬃcient large exchange
rate m≫ 1
Here, we give an approximated form of Eq. (1). When the time scale of the exchange rate, m, is
significantly smaller than other parameters (m≫ 1) the eﬀect of the exchange between the patches
on the entire population abundance (X = x1 + x2) is suﬃciently small at the time scale of the
population dynamics, τ . In such situation, the aggregation method [1–3] gives the approximated
form of Eq. (3):
dX
dτ
= rX
(
1− X
K
)
− (q′1e1 + · · ·+ q′naena)X, (1)
where, q′i = (1− α)qi and na is the actual number of institutions. Note under the sole-owner man-
agement, in the parentheses of the second term becomes q′ses, where q′s and es are the catchability
and the fishing eﬀort of the sole-owner management, respectively. By the same assumption that
sole-owner management is based on the fisheries parameters of one of the existing institutions as
in the main text, s ∈ {1, . . . , na} is assumed. The fisheries profit of the institutions i is
πi =
(
piq
′
iX
∗ − ci
)
ei, i ∈ {1, . . . , na} (2)
Using the result obtained by Mesterton-Gibbons [4], we easily deduce the rational choice of insti-
tution i in our spatially-explicit model
q′iei =
{
r
na+1
[
1− 11−α
(
nabi −
∑na
j ̸=i bj
)]
, if 1 ≤ i ≤ np
0, if i > np
(3)
where, na is the actual number of institutions, and
np = max
[
k|kbk < 1− α+
k−1∑
i
bi
]
, (4)
is the potential number of users among which the economically feasible fishery is plausible, hence
na ≤ np. bi := ci/(Kpiqi) is the eﬃciency parameter of institution i [4], and by the same assumption
as in the main text, we set bs = min{b1, b2, · · · , bna}. We also assume that any institutions By Eq.
(3), we can calculate the total fishing pressure:
na∑
i
q′iei =
rna
na + 1
(
1− ⟨b⟩na
1− α
)
, (5)
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where, ⟨b⟩na is the average of the eﬃciency parameter over the na institutions, namely ⟨b⟩na :=∑na
i bi/na. Specifically, we define ⟨b⟩1 := bs. By substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (1), the Nash
equilibrium population abundance under the na-player’s non-cooperative management is
XAggrena =
K
na + 1
(
1 +
∑na
i bi
1− α
)
. (6)
Given Eqs. (3) and (6) we can calculate the profit by Eq. (2) given rational choice of institutions
πAggrei =
pirK
(na + 1)2
⎧⎨⎩1− 11− α
⎛⎝nabi − na∑
j ̸=i
bj
⎞⎠⎫⎬⎭
2
. (7)
Eq. (6) and (7) give values for the sole-owner management if na = 1, and for the non-cooperative
management if 1 < na ≤ np. We can calculate the Eqs. (6) and (8) as a na-institution case:
ρˆfpna =
4
(na + 1)2
(∑na
i {1− α− (nabi −
∑
j ̸=i bj)}2
(1− α− bs)2
)
, (8)
ρˆpana =
2
na + 1
(
1− α+∑nai bi
1− α+ bs
)
, (9)
where, ρˆ· represents the quantity obtained by the aggregation method. For ρˆfpna and ρˆpana , we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition A1 Eqs. (8) and (9) satisfy the following properties:
(P1) dρˆfpna/dα ≤ 0,
(P2) dρˆpana/dα > 0.
Since the statement P2 is obvious, we only show that the statement P1 holds. By diﬀerentiating
Eq. (8) with α, we obtain
dρˆfpna
dα
=
8
(na + 1)2
⎡⎣(1− α− bs) na∑
i
(1− α− (nabi −
na∑
j ̸=i
bj)) (10)
× {(1− α− (nabi −
na∑
j ̸=i
bj))− (1− α− bs)}
⎤⎦/(1− α− bs)4, (11)
where, we find that we only require to show the sign of inside the bracket. Let θi := 1−α− (nabi−∑na
j ̸=i bj), M = max{θ1, θ2, · · · , θna}, and M ′ = (1 − α − bs)M . With the condition Eq. (4), we
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obtain
(1− α− bs)
na∑
i
(1− α− (nabi −
na∑
j ̸=i
bj)){(1− α− (nabi −
na∑
j ̸=i
bj))− (1− α− bs)}
≤M ′
na∑
i
{(1− α− (nabi −
na∑
j ̸=i
bj))− (1− α− bs)},
= M ′
na∑
i
(bs − bi),
≤ 0, (12)
where, to get the last line, we used the assumption bs = min{b1, b2, · · · , bna}. Equality is achieved
when bi = bs holds for all i. Thus, the statement P1 holds.
The proposition suggests that, in relation to the sole-owner management, an increase of the
MPAs fraction, α, decreases the gross fisheries profit of the non-cooperative management, and
increases the population abundance.
Example: two-player management
As in the main text, here we give some results of the aggregated model of two-player’s non-
cooperative management. Substituting na = 2 into Eqs. (8) and (9), we obtain
ρˆfp2 =
4
9
(∑
i{1− α− (2bi − bj ̸=i)}2
(1− α− bs)2
)
, (i, j = 1, 2) (13)
ρˆpa2 =
2
3
(
1− α+ b1 + b2
1− α+ bs
)
. (14)
Specifically, when b := bs = b1 = b2, we obtain
ρˆfp2 =
8
9
, (15)
ρˆpa2 =
2
3
(
1− α+ 2b
1− α+ b
)
. (16)
We verify that the values shows in Fig. 2 in the main text approaches these values as the exchange
rate, m, becomes large. Because of the Proposition A1., an increase of the MPA fraction increases
ρpa2 . Eq. (15) does not contain the MPA fraction α, and this situation is equivalent to the result
obtained by non-spatial model Eq. (1) in the main text.
In the two-player’s non-cooperative management, we can also obtain evenness of the distribution
of the gross fisheries profit defined in the main text (Eq. 7):
ρˆev2 =
{1− α− (2b1 − b2)}2∑
i{1− α− (2bi − bj ̸=i)}2
. (i, j = 1, 2) (17)
As in the main text, we set b1 ≤ b2. Then we get dρˆev2/dα > 0, and clearly ρˆev2 ≥ 1/2, suggesting
that an increase of the MPAs fraction increases unevenness of the profit distribution.
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Appendix A.2 Solution when no exchange occurs m = 0
We consider the situation where no exchange of the populations between the fishing ground and
MPAs occurs (M(x1, x2) = 0). In this situation, the model is simplified as
dx1
dt
= rx1
(
1− x1
K1
)
−
na∑
i
qiei, (18)
dx2
dt
= rx2
(
1− x2
K2
)
, (19)
By the similar discussion above, we find the rational choice of institution i is equivalent to Eq. (3).
Due to the fact that only the population in the fishing ground contribute to the fisheries profit
of the institution i (i = 1, 2), therefore we can easily calculate the population abundance and the
fisheries profit of institution i given rational choices of all institutions as
Xm0na =
K
na + 1
(
1 + αna +
na∑
i
bi
)
, (20)
πm0i =
pirK
(na + 1)2
⎧⎨⎩1− α−
⎛⎝nabi − na∑
j ̸=i
bj
⎞⎠⎫⎬⎭
2
, (21)
where, superscript m0 represents the quantity obtained when the exchange rate m = 0. Denoting
ρ¯· as quantities obtained when m = 0, the proportion of the population abundance (Eq. (8) in the
main text) becomes
ρ¯pana =
2
na + 1
(
1 + αna +
∑na
j ̸=i bj
1 + α+ bs
)
. (22)
Also, one can easily see that ρ¯fpna is equivalent to Eq. (8). Therefore, the statement P1 of
Proposition A1 holds.
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Appendix B Eﬀect of density-dependence in migration term
Here, we consider the eﬀect of the density-dependent migration to see how the biological assumption
alters our result obtained in the main text. One of the possible generalizations of the Eq. (4) to
take density-dependent into consideration may be [1, 2]
M(x1, x2) = m
{(
x2
K2
)β
(1− α)x2 +
(
x1
K1
)β
αx1
}
, (B.1)
where K1 = (1 − α)K and K2 = αK, and β ≥ 0 determines the strength of density dependence.
Larger value in β gives more intense density-dependence. Eq. (B.1) is equivalent to Eq. (4) when
β = 0.
Figs. B.1 and B.2 is the eﬀect of density-dependent migration with strength β = 1 (weaker den-
sity dependence) and β = 2 (stronger density dependence) on Eqs. (6) and (8). Both figures show
the qualitatively similar eﬀect especially when the cost of the fishing eﬀort, c, is large. However,
when the cost of the fishing eﬀort c is small, the eﬀect of density dependent migration becomes
more prominent: intensive competitions between the institutions are observed in a wider range of
parameter set (darker color).
Figure B.1: Non-cooperative management with MPAs with a weaker density-dependent migration
(β = 1). x axis is the fraction of MPAs, and y axis is the exchange rate between the patches, m.
Each column has diﬀerent values of the cost of fishing eﬀort (c = 0.1, 1, 10). The first row shows
the fractional decline of the gross fisheries profit ρfp2 relative to the sole-owner management (Eq.
6 in the main text). The second row shows the proportion of the total population abundance,
XNash2/XSole (Eq. 8 in the main text), resulted in the non-cooperative management and the sole-
owner management. Other parameter values are r = 1, K = 100. Note when the fraction of MPAs,
α, is 0, it corresponds to the (non-spatial) Schaefer model.
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Figure B.2: Non-cooperative management with MPAs with a stronger density-dependent migration
(β = 2). Other notations are the same as Fig. B.1.
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Appendix C Sensitivity analysis
Here we examine the sensitivity of the parameters dependence of the growth rate, r, carrying
capacity, K, and relative diﬀerence in the eﬃciency parameter, bi, to see how changes in the
parameter values alter the results shown in the main text. Overall, our main conclusion are observed
in many parameter sets That is, a prominent increase of competition occurs when exchange rate of
the species between fishing ground and MPAs is not large, and intermediate fractions of the MPAs,
although the range in the parameter space can shift slightly (Fig. C.1).
Figure C.1: Eﬀect of diﬀerent values of the growth rate r = {0.5, 1, 2} on the non-cooperative
management with MPAs. x axis is the fraction of MPAs, and y axis is the exchange rate between
the patches, m. The first row shows the fractional decline of the gross fisheries profit ρfp2 relative to
the sole-owner management (Eq. 6 in the main text). The second row shows the proportion of the
total population abundance, XNash2/XSole (Eq. 8 in the main text), resulted in the non-cooperative
management and the sole-owner management. Other parameter values are c = 1, K = 100. Note
when the fraction of MPAs, α, is 0, it corresponds to the (non-spatial) Schaefer model.
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Figure C.2: Eﬀect of diﬀerent values of the carrying capacity K = {50, 100, 200} on the non-
cooperative management with MPAs. Other parameter values are c = 1, r = 1. Other notations
are the same as Fig. C.1
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Figure C.3: Non-cooperative management with MPAs with diﬀerent eﬃciency parameter (b2 =
0.6b1 = 0.6bs). The third raw represents evenness of the distribution of the gross fisheries profit
between institutions (Eq. 7 in the main text). r = 1, K = 100. Other notations are the same as
Fig. C.1.
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